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of CAL on growth after accounting for these two channels is negligible. These results call for
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1. Introduction 
 
The globalization of financial linkages has spurred a lively debate on the growth-effects of 
capital account liberalization. In the applied literature, this question is normally addressed 
within a standard single equation framework of the following type: 
 
(1)   ititit xy   i tβ10  
 
where y is the growth rate of per-capita real GDP in generic country i, x is a measure of 
capital account liberalization (CAL), Ω is a set of control variables, ε is a stochastic 
disturbance, αs and β are the parameters to be estimated, and t denotes time. 
 
The specification of Ω, the empirical definition of x, the estimation methodology, and the 
composition of the sample differ across studies. It is therefore unsurprising that results also 
differ to some extent. However, the survey works of Eichengreen (2001), Lane (2004) and 
Edison et al. (2004) generally conclude that the literature has so far failed to provide robust 
and systematic evidence of a positive and significant effect of capital account liberalization 
on growth. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to reconsider the above conclusion in light of new evidence 
stemming from the estimation of a system of equations. The rationale for using a system is to 
explicitly model the interactions between capital account liberalization and some of the other 
controls in equation (1). In fact, if x determines some of the variables in Ω, then the estimated 
coefficient on x will be imprecisely estimated, thus increasing the likelihood of not rejecting 
the null hypothesis in a standard t-test. The single equation framework (1) might therefore be 
inadequate to make correct inference on the significance of the relationship between x and y. 
 
This paper estimates a system of three equations where growth, financial development 
(FINDEV) and trade openness (OPEN) are the dependant variables. Three main results are 
obtained. First, CAL is a significant determinant of both FINDEV and OPEN. Second, 
FINDEV and OPEN significantly determine growth. These first two results together imply 
that financial development and trade openness are the channels through which capital account 
liberalization affects growth. Third, the residual effect of CAL on growth after accounting for 
the financial development and trade openness channels is negligible. 
 
2. Econometric model 
 
The literature emphasizes two main macroeconomic effects of capital account liberalization. 
One is the strengthening of the domestic financial system: liberalizing restrictions on 
international portfolio flows tends to increase stock market liquidity, and allowing a greater 
presence of foreign banks fosters the efficiency of domestic financial intermediation
1
. The 
other effect is the specialization in production resulting from increased international risk 
sharing opportunities: by providing the necessary conditions for the integration of 
international financial markets, CAL facilitates the insurance of production risk via 
ownership diversification
2
. Production risk insurance then allows countries to exploit the 
                                                 
1
 See for instance Levine (2001) and Chinn and Ito (2002 and 2006).  
 
2
 Several theoretical models incorporate this type of mechanism: see Obstfled (1994), Acemoglu and Zilibotti 
(1997), and Feeney (1998). The empirical evidence is less conclusive. Kamleli et al. (2003) show that 
international risk sharing increases specilization. Imbs (2004) reports a positive effect of international financial 
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gains from specialization through international trade, thus implying that trade openness is a 
function of CAL
3
.   
 
These theoretical considerations suggest that CAL is a determinant of both domestic financial 
development (FINDEV) and trade openness (OPEN). At the same time, there is now a vast 
literature indicating that FINDEV and OPEN are two key determinants of economic growth
4
. 
Financial development and trade openness are therefore two channels through which CAL 
can affect growth. A structural empirical representation of these links is as follows: 
 
(2)   ititititit sfxy   i tΜβ13210       
(3)   ititititit syxf   itΓβ23210  
(4)   ititititit fyxs   i tΚβ33210  
 
where y, x, ε, i, t  are the same as in equation (1); f and s respectively denote FINDEV and 
OPEN; М, K and Г are sets of controls that might have some elements in common, υ ζ are 
stochastic disturbances and αs, γs, ω’s, β1 , β2 , and β3 are the coefficients to be estimated. For 
estimation purposes, CAL will be measured by index of Chinn and Ito (2002 and 2006), 
FINDEV will be proxied by credit to the private sector in percent of GDP, and OPEN will be 
defined as the imports plus exports share of GDP. 
 
Equation (2) is a restatement of the growth model (1). CAL appears on the r.h.s. together with 
FINDEV and OPEN, so that α1 effectively represents the residual effect of capital account 
liberalization on growth after controlling for its indirect effect through financial development 
and trade openness. Drawing on Edison et al. (2002) and Schularik and Stegel (2006), М 
includes lagged per-capita GDP (in logs), government consumption expenditure in percent of 
GDP, the number of school years attended by the average individual in the population, and 
the population growth rate. The model thus allows for the impact of relative convergence, 
factors accumulation, and government size in what can be seen as a combination of neo-
classical and endogenous growth theories
5
. 
 
Equation (3) models financial development. The effect of CAL is captured by γ1, while γ2 
represents the possible feedback effect of growth onto the domestic financial system and γ3 
allows for endogeneity between FINDEV and OPEN. The other controls are the log-level of 
per-capita income, a dummy taking value 1 if country’s legal system originates from the 
                                                                                                                                                        
integration on specialization. However, Kose et al. (2007) report that the empirical effect of financial 
globalization on risk sharing is significantly less strong than what the theory predicts. 
 
3
 If international trade increases aggregate risks (as in Rodrik, 1998), then risk cannot be diversified in purely 
domestic financial markets and therefore greater international financial integration increases openness to trade. 
See also Svaleryd and Vlachos (2002). In addition, Feeney and Hillman (2001) note that the political-economic 
opposition to trade liberalization is weaker when financial systems are more interntionally open, so that CAL 
leads to greater trade openness. 
 
4
 For an overview of this literature see Aghion and Durlauf (2005, Chapters 12 and 23 in particular). 
 
5
 The inclusion of the GDP share of gross capital formation on the r.h.s. of equation (2) does not qualitatively 
affect the estimates of α1 , α2 , α3 , and β1.  Robustness checks on system estimates were also conducted by 
enriching the basic specification of equation (2) with other popular variables in the growth literature (see 
Durlauf et al. 2005). Results are available upon request and do not substantially differ from those reported in the 
paper. 
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French common law, the inflation rate and the government debt to GDP ratio. This 
specification therefore accounts for structural, institutional and policy determinants of 
FINDEV (see Rajan and Zingales, 2003 and Balatagi et al. 2007). In particular, the legal 
origin dummy accounts for the political and adaptability channels used by a growing body of 
literature to explain cross-country differences in financial development (see Beck et al. 2003 
and Acemoglu et al. 2004). 
 
Equation (4) refers to the determinants of trade openness. The specification allows for a 
direct effect of CAL (captured by ω1), for the feedback effect of growth on openness 
(captured by ω2) and for joint endogeneity of OPEN and FINDEV (captured by ω3). In 
addition, the specification also controls for a size effect, through the inclusion of the log of 
total population and log country’s area, and for a demand effect, through the inclusion of log 
per-capita income (see Alesina and Waiczarg, 1998). 
 
The choice of the estimator must be driven by the assumptions concerning the structure of the 
variance-covariance matrix of residuals. The most general structure allows for 
heteroskedasticity, contemporaneous correlation of the residuals across equations and non-
zero correlation between some of the regressors and the error term in each equation. In this 
case, the GMM-system estimator proposed by Wooldridge (2002) with White’s 
heteroskedasticity correction is a suitable estimator. However, the problem with the system 
estimator is that if one of the equations is misspecified, then estimates of all parameters in the 
system will be affected. Therefore, system estimates should be complemented by a set of 
equation-by-equation estimates obtained from a standard 2 stages-least-squares instrumental 
variables estimator. 
 
The Hausman test of endogeneity shows that (i) CAL, government expenditure, average years 
of schooling, and population growth are potentially endogenous to the GDP growth rate, (ii) 
CAL, inflation and government debt are potentially endogenous to FINDEV, (iii) CAL is 
potentially endogenous to OPEN. These potentially endogenous regressors are then 
instrumented by legal origin dummies, geographical latitude, the percentage of Muslims in 
the population and the percentage of Catholics in the population, an index of democracy, a 
trichotomous variable capturing the type of political system, and three indicators of quality of 
the polity (see the appendix for details). Following Baum et al. (2003), the validity of this 
choice of instruments is tested in two ways: (i) in the regression of each potentially 
endogenous variable on the set of instruments (first stage regression), the null hypothesis that 
instruments are jointly insignificant is always rejected, (ii) the null hypothesis of the Sargan 
test of overidentfying restrictions is never rejected
6
.     
 
The model is estimated on a sample of 79 countries over the period 1970-2000. To focus on 
long-term effects, data are averaged over five years spell. See the appendix for data definition 
and sources and for the full list of countries. 
 
3. Results 
 
To start with, Column 1 of Table 1 reports the estimated coefficient of a single equation 
growth model. The estimator is Caselli et al.’s (1996) version of Arellano and Bond (1991) 
GMM single equation estimator. It can be seen that both FINDEV and OPEN increase 
                                                 
6
 The full set of results concerning these tests is available from the author upon request. The statistics of the 
Sargan test are reported at the bottom of Table 1. 
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growth and that the coefficient on CAL is not statistically significant. In this respect, the 
equation reproduces the overall conclusion drawn from the existing literature: CAL fails to 
affect growth significantly
7
. Column 2 shows the same equation without FINDEV and OPEN 
on the r.h.s. CAL has now a positive and significant coefficient, but the equation is clearly 
misspecified since some relevant variables (FINDEV and OPEN) are omitted.  
 
Table 1: Estimation results 
  Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5 Column 6 
Equation (2): dependent variable is growth 
Constant …  0.104** 0.096** 0.089** 0.121*** 
Schooling -0.096 0.067** -0.005* -0.004 -0.005* -0.003 
Capital account liberalization (CAL)  0.055 0.080*** -0.014 -0.013 -0.015 -0.007 
Credit to private sector (FINDEV)  0.422** .. 0.176*** 0.174*** 0.168*** 0.144*** 
Trade openness (OPEN) 1.404** .. 0.057** 0.052* 0.057* 0.038 
Per-capita income 0.076*** 0.303*** -0.011* -0.011* 0.008 -0.014** 
Pop. Growth -13.471*** -7.611*** -2.053*** -1.813*** -1.954*** -1.886*** 
Gov. expenditure -0.641 -0.893 -0.115* -0.092 -0.114 -0.057 
       
Equation (3): dependent variable is credit to private sector (FINDEV) 
Constant .. .. -0.004 -0.025 0.074 -0.008 
Per-capita income .. .. 0.039* 0.043** 0.042 0.041 
Capital account liberalization (CAL) .. .. 0.153*** 0.125*** 0.121** 0.143*** 
Trade openness (OPEN) .. .. -0.267* -0.204* -0.262* -0.273* 
Inflation .. .. 0.230 0.247 -0.108 -0.032 
Government debt .. .. 0.300 0.161 0.085 0.298 
French legal origin .. .. -0.057* -0.045 -0.041 -0.030 
Growth .. .. .. 2.392*** 2.350 1.629 
       
Equation (4): dependent variable is trade openness (OPEN) 
Constant .. .. 2.363*** 2.542*** 2.457*** 2.562*** 
Per-capita income .. .. -0.087** -0.075** -0.070 -0.077** 
Population .. .. -0.325*** -0.433*** -0.408*** -0.442*** 
Area .. .. -0.048*** -0.042*** -0.042*** -0.043*** 
Capital account liberalization (CAL) .. .. 0.135*** 0.163*** 0.162** 0.139** 
Credit to private sector (FINDEV)  .. .. 0.342 0.086 0.043 0.210 
Growth .. ..  2.601 2.727 2.424 
       
Sargan test statistic 2.105 4.718 0.049 0.040 0.025 .. 
p-value 0.74 0.69 0.295 0.42 0.964 .. 
Included observations 197 211 487 487 487 .. 
Total system observations .. .. 1130 1130 1130 .. 
See the appendix for variables definition and sources. *,**,*** denote statistical significance at 10%,5% and 
1% confidence level respectively.   Estimators are as follows: Caselli et al. (1996)’s GMM in columns 1 and 
2; System-GMM with White’s correction for heteroskedasticity in columns 3 and 4; system-GMM with 
heterosckedasticity and autocorrelation consistent variance-covariance matrix in column 5, and equation-by-
equation 2SLS in column 6.  The Sargan test statistic is the statistic of the test of overidentifying restrictions 
in GMM estimation. 
 
                                                 
7
 The growth equation has been re-estimated using both OLS and standard single equation 2SLS IV and results 
are not qualitatively different from those reported in the table. 
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These first two columns provide an example of the potential fallacy in estimating the growth-
CAL nexus within the single equation framework. Column (3) therefore reports the GMM 
estimates of the system of three equations presented in Section 2. The feedback effect of 
growth on FINDEV and OPEN is for now restricted to be zero (i.e. γ2 = ω2 = 0). The 
estimated α2, α3, ω1, and γ1 are all positive and statistically significant. This means that: (i) 
FINDEV and OPEN promote growth and (ii) CAL increases both FINDEV and OPEN. 
Therefore, financial development and trade openness are two channels through which capital 
account liberalization stimulates growth. The estimated coefficients mean that an increase in 
CAL by 0.5 points (which would be empirically equivalent to reducing capitol controls in 
China to the average level observed in Chile in 1996-2000) would increase domestic credit to 
the private sector by about 6 points of GDP and trade openness by about 6.5 points of GDP. 
These effects would in turn raise per capita growth by roughly 1.3 points per year. The 
coefficient α1 is instead not significant, meaning that after accounting for the indirect effects 
of CAL through FINDEV and OPEN, the residual direct effect of capital account 
liberalization on growth is negligible.  
 
The results on the other controls are worth a mention. There is mild evidence of a relative 
converge effect in growth, as suggested by the neo-classical theory. Schooling instead 
appears to hurt growth, even though the coefficient is only marginally significant and it will 
become insignificant in the subsequent specifications of the system. This might be due to the 
fact that male schooling and female schooling tend to have effects of opposite sign on 
growth, and therefore in aggregate they cancel each other out (see Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 
1995). The French legal origin, reflecting an overall worse quality of institutions, negatively 
affects financial development, a result that is consistent with Beck et al (2003) and Acemoglu 
et al. (2004). However, it will turn out that this finding is not robust to the inclusion of 
growth as an explanatory variable in the FINDEV equation. There is also strong evidence of a 
size effect in trade openness as proposed by Alesina and Waiczarg (1998). Finally, there is 
evidence of a marginally significant effect of OPEN on FINDEV, while the opposite is not 
true. The negative sign estimated for γ3 is in fact consistent with the findings reported by 
Baltagi et al. (2007) and suggests that a combination of trade and financial liberalization does 
not necessarily lead to deeper financial development.  
 
In column 4, the restriction γ2 = ω2 = 0 is lifted. It turns out that faster growth increases 
financial development, in spite of possible multicollinearity with the legal origin dummy, 
while the effect on trade openness is negligible. With respect to the effect of CAL on growth 
nothing changes substantially relative to column 3.  In column 5, the variance-covariance 
matrix is not only heterosckedasticity consistent, but also autocorrelation consistent. Once 
again the bulk of the results from column 3 are confirmed. Finally, column 6 reports 
equation-by-equation estimates. The most important change relative to GMM-estimates is 
that OPEN becomes marginally insignificant (p-value is 0.12) in the growth equation. This 
means that while CAL still increases openness to trade, this latter no longer determines 
growth. Consequently, the only transmission channel of CAL to growth is through financial 
development. According to these latter estimates, a 0.5 points increase in the index of CAL 
generates an increase of 0.75 percentage points in the growth rate. 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
The estimation of a system of three equations indicates that CAL has a rather strong positive 
impact on growth. However, this impact occurs through financial development and trade 
openness. It is therefore difficult to estimate it correctly within a single equation model that 
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includes both financial development and trade openness as control variables. After 
accounting for the transmission through financial development and trade openness, the 
residual impact of capital account liberalization is not statistically significant.  
 
More work has to be done in the future on the theoretical foundations of the three equations 
empirical representation used in this paper. It will be also interesting to test empirically 
whether the transmission channels linking CAL and growth differ between developing and 
industrial countries. Finally, as more data on international financial flows become available 
for a broader group of countries, it will be important to use de facto measures of financial 
openness in addition to the de jure index of Chinn and Ito (2002 and 2006). 
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Appendix: List of countries, variables description and data sources 
 
 
 
 
Countries in the sample 
 
Algeria Estonia Korea Romania 
Argentina Finland Kyrgyz Rep. Russia 
Armenia France Latvia Slovak Republic 
Australia Gambia Lesotho Slovenia 
Austria Ghana Libya South Africa 
Azerbaijan Greece Lithuania Spain 
Belarus Guatemala Malawi Sri Lanka 
Belgium Haiti Malaysia Swaziland 
Bolivia Honduras Mauritius Syria 
Brazil Hungary Mexico Tanzania 
Chile Iceland Moldova Thailand 
China Indonesia Morocco Turkey 
Colombia Iran Nepal Uganda 
Costa Rica Ireland Netherlands United Kingdom 
Cyprus Israel New Zealand United States 
Czech Republic Italy Nigeria Uruguay 
Denmark Jamaica Pakistan Venezuela 
Dominican Rep. Jordan Peru Zambia 
Ecuador Kazakhstan Philippines Zimbabwe 
Egypt Kenya Portugal  
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Variables definition and sources 
Variables Description Sources 
Model variables 
Schooling 
 
Average number of school years in adult population 
 
Barro and 
Lee 
(2000) 
 
CAL First standardized principal component of R1, R2, 
SHARE3 and R4, where: (i) R1 takes value 1 in the 
absence of multiple exchange rates, (ii) R2 takes value 
1 if current account transactions are not restricted, 
(iii) R3 takes value 1 if capital account transactions 
are not restricted, (iv) R4 takes value 1 in the absence 
of a requirement to surrender export proceeds. 
SHARE4 is then constructed in each year as the 
average of R3 in that year and in the four preceding 
years 
 
Chinn 
and Ito 
(2002) 
FINDEV 
 
Domestic credit to private sector in percent of GDP WDI 
OPEN Exports plus imports in percent of GDP WDI 
 
Per-capita income Log of per-capita real GDP WDI 
 
Growth Annual percent change in per-capita income WDI 
 
Population Log of total population WDI 
 
Population growth Annual percent change in population WDI 
 
Government 
expenditure 
 
Total government expenditure in percent of GDP WDI 
Inflation Annual percent change in consumer price index WDI 
 
Government debt Total government debt in percent of GDP WDI 
 
Area Log of country’s total surface area WDI 
 
French legal 
origin 
Dummy variable taking value 1 if country’s 
commercial/company law is based on the French civil 
law 
La Porta 
et al. 
(1999) 
 
Instrumental variables 
Democracy Index of democracy Polity IV 
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Autocracy Index of autocracy Polity IV 
 
Polity Difference between Democracy and Autocracy Polity IV 
 
Catholic Population of Catholic religion in percent of total 
population 
Gradstein 
et al. 
(2003) 
 
Muslim Population of Islamic religion in percent of total 
population 
Gradstein 
et al. 
(2003) 
 
Latitude Latitude of a nation’s capital CIA 
World 
Factbook 
 
System Type of political system: taking values 1 
(presidential), 2 (aseembly elected) and 3 
(parliamentary) depending on the constitutional 
arrangement disciplining the exercise of power 
 
DPI 
Regulation of 
participation 
Extent and intensity of binding rules on when, 
whether and how political preferences are expressed 
 
Polity IV 
Competitiveness 
of recruitment 
Extent to which prevailing modes of advancement 
give subordinates equal opportunities to become 
superordinates 
 
Polity IV 
Regulation of 
chief executive 
Extent to which a polity has institutionalized 
procedures for transferring executive power 
 
Polity IV 
Legal origin 
(Socialist) 
Dummy variable taking value 1 if country’s 
commercial/company low is based on the socialist 
legal tradition 
 
La Porta 
et al. 
(1999) 
Legal original 
(Scandinavian) 
Dummy variable taking value 1 if country’s 
commercial/company low is based on the 
Scandinavian legal tradition 
La Porta 
et al. 
(1999) 
 
Detail of data sources: 
 
WDI: World Development Indicator 2006, The World Bank, Washington D.C. 
 
Chinn and Ito (2002): Chinn M., H. and Ito “Capital Account Liberalization, Institutions and Financial 
Development: Cross-Country Evidence”, NBER Working Paper 8967 
http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~mchinn/research.html 
 
La Porta et al. (1999): La Porta R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny (1999) “The 
Quality of Government” Journal of Law, Economics and Organisation, 1, 222-279. 
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Polity IV: Monty G., M. Narshall, and K. Jaggers “Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 
1800-2003”: http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity 
 
CIA World Fact Book: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html 
 
Barro and Lee (2000): Barro R.J., J.W. and Lee (2000) “International Data on Education Attainment: 
Updates and Implications”, CID Working Paper 42, http://www.cid.harvard.edu/ciddata/ciddata.html 
 
Gradstein et al. (2003): Gradstein M., B. Milanovic, and Y. Ying (2003) “Democracy, Ideology and 
Income Inequality: An Empirical Analysis”, http://129.3.20.41/eps/pe/papers/0305/0305002.pdf 
 
DPI: Database of Political Institutions, Beck T., G. Clarke, A. Groff, P. Keefer, and P. Walsh (2001) 
"New tools in comparative political economy: The Database of Political Institutions." World Bank 
Economic Review 15, 165-176. 
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